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NOTES
State of Louisiana v. Jackson: Evidence of Allegations of
Prior Sexual Abuse by Accused in an Intra-Family Context
I. THE JACKSON CASE AND THE COURT'S HOLDING
In State v. Jackson,' the defendant was charged with three counts of
molesting his granddaughters, ages seven and ten.2 The defendant's grand-
daughters testified that on several occasions defendant kissed them and touched
their breasts and buttocks. At a pre-trial Prieur hearing,3 the court considered
the admissibility of testimony from the defendant's three adult daughters--one
was the mother of one of the victims-who testified their father molested them
when they were minors. The defendant's daughters testified not only that their
father kissed and fondled their breasts and buttocks, but one daughter also
testified her father had sexual intercourse with her, and another testified her
father fondled her vagina and exposed himself to her.
The trial court decided to exclude from trial all evidence that the defendant
molested his daughters when each was a similar age to the victims. The court
of appeal denied the state's application for supervisory writs.4 However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs.5 Held: In a case against a grandfather
for molestation of his granddaughters with "intention of arousing or gratifying
sexual desires" (an element of the crime), evidence of prior molestations by the
accused of his descendants that are similar to the acts in question is admissible
to prove the accused's intent to gratify sexual desires "negat[ing] any [future]
defenses that [the accused) acted without intent or that the acts were accidental"
and to prove the defendant's plan to "systematically engage" in sexual relations
with family members as they matured physically.' According to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the evidence of similar acts was admissible even though the
purported offenses against his daughters occurred fifteen to twenty years before
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993).
2. Molestation of a juvenile is the commission by anyone over the age of seventeen of
any lewd or lascivious acts upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age
of seventeen ... with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either
person, by the use of force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation, threat
of great bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue of a position of control or
supervision over the juvenile. Lack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a
defense.
La. PS. 14:81.2 (1994).
3. A Prieur hearing is a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of certain
evidence. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
4. Jackson, 625 So. 2d at 146.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 152.
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the offenses against his granddaughters.! Further, the court held the testimony
of the adult daughters that the defendant had sexual intercourse with one
daughter, exposed himself to another daughter, and fondled his daughters'
vaginas was inadmissible In these situations, the court found the prejudicial
effect of the evidence outweighed its probative worth, and this evidence therefore
was irrelevant.9
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO JACKSON
Traditionally, English and American courts refused to admit evidence of a
defendant's bad moral character in a criminal prosecution when offered to prove
conduct on a particular occasion.' This rule developed out of the Anglo-Saxon
insistence that the prosecution had to prove that the accused committed a specific
crime, not merely that the accused is a bad person." Although character
evidence may have been relevant, it was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-
in-chief because of its prejudicial effect on the defendant.' The prosecution
could, however, introduce character evidence in rebuttal if the defendant
introduced evidence of his good character.' 3
Three reasons were advanced to justify the exclusion of prior bad acts of the
accused: (1) the strong tendency of a jury to believe an accused is guilty of a
charge merely because of their belief that an accused is a bad person; (2) the
burden which would be placed on an accused to defend against such claims; and
(3) the tendency of a jury to find an accused guilty of a charged crime because
he escaped punishment for his previous crimes."'
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing La. Code Evid. art. 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.").
10. Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
in Sex Offender Cases, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 129 (1993). For further discussion on the rule for
admissibility of character evidence, see generally IA John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law §§ 54.1-61 (1992); 2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 242,
300-307 (1992); 1 McCormick on Evidence §§ 186-195 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Jack B.
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence §§ 404(01)-404(22) (1994).
11. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 529 (1994); see also IA Wigmore, supra note 10, at 1212.
12. See generally Wigmore, supra note 10.
13. Unless and until the defendant introduces evidence of his good character, the long
established rule forbids the prosecution from introducing evidence of the defendant's bad character.
State v. Sutfield, 354 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (La. 1978).
14. IA Wigrore, supra note 10, at 1215; see also id. at 1212 ("It is objectionable not because
it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much ...."). In State v. Goza, 408 So.
2d 1349 (La. 1982), the court stated that "[tlhe introduction of other crimes evidence involves
constitutional problems because of the danger that a defendant may be tried for charges of which he
has no notice and for which he is unprepared and which unfairly prejudice him in the eyes of the
jury." Id. at 1353.
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While the general rule remains that other crimes evidence'5 is not admissi-
ble to prove character, there are exceptions.' 6 Although not admissible to prove
bad character, a bad act may be admissible to prove intent, motive, plan, or
knowledge. 7 Louisiana courts, as well as courts across the country, have had
difficulty implementing this rule.'" Defining these concepts and balancing the
probative value of evidence against the risk of prejudice, including how temporal
remoteness affects the decision on the admissibility of the evidence, are
particularly troublesome issues.' 9
Intent has been regarded as the state of mind with which the act is done.'
For evidence of other crimes to be admissible to prove intent, the element of
15. The phrase other crimes evidence is used to denote crimes or acts that the prosecution
claims to have been committed by the defendant. These may include charged and uncharged crimes
occurring before or after the act in question. See William A. Jones, Other Crimes Evidence in
Louisiana, 33 La. L. Rev. 614 (1973); see generally George W. Pugh et al., Handbook on Louisiana
Evidence Law 296 n.1 (1994).
16. Louisiana's rules of evidence as to the admissibility of character evidence generally follow
the common law and the later embodiment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Compare La. Code
Evid. art. 404(BX1):
Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,
or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that
is the subject of the present proceeding.
with Fed. R. Evid. art. 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
There are, however, significant limitations in Louisiana's adaptation. See La. Code Evid. art. 1103:
Article 404(B) and 104(A) neither codifies nor affects the law of other crimes evidence,
as set forth in State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), State v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 466
(La. 1984), and State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973) and their progeny, as regards
the notice requirement and the clear and convincing standard in regard to other crimes
evidence. Those cases are law and apply to Articles 404(B) and 104(A), unless modified
by subsequent state jurisprudential development.
17. La. Code Evid. art. 404(B). Article 404(B)'s predecessors were La. R.S. 15:445-446
(repealed 1989). Although 404(B) contains a longer list, it generally accords with rules applied by
the Louisiana courts under the Louisiana Revised Statutes. See Pugh et al., supra note 15, at 295
cmt. k.
18. For further discussion on the difficulty Louisiana courts have with the admissibility of other
crimes evidence, see Huey L. Golden, Comment, Knowledge, Intent, System and Motive: A Much
Needed Return to the Requirement of Independent Relevance, 55 La. L. Rev. 179 (1994).
19. La. Code Evid. art 403.
20. Jones, supra note 15, at 614; see also 2 Wigmore, supra note 10, at 43.
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intent must be a real issue at trial.2 Plan encompasses two different con-
cepts.' First, plan may refer to a cause of action in which each crime is an
"integral part of an over-arching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the
defendant." Second, plan may refer to a particular scheme or system in which
the circumstances are so peculiar and similar that one could logically reason the
acts were committed by the same person.24
Courts have also had difficulty with the issue of remoteness in time between
the charged act and the other crimes. The probative worth of other crimes
evidence is reduced the further removed temporally the other crime is from the
charged act. When weighing the probative worth of evidence against its
prejudicial effect, however, courts consider not only remoteness in time, but also
differences as to location and types of offenses.25
Louisiana courts have undergone several shifts in interpreting the rules of
admissibility of other crimes evidence. Prior to the 1950's, Louisiana courts
were exceptionally protective of the rights of the accused.26  For example, in
1923, in State v. Norphlis,27 the defendant was charged with theft for stealing
a dress and hosiery from a local shop. At trial, the state introduced as evidence
items from a prior theft allegedly committed by the defendant at the same shop
against the defendant to prove system and intent.28 The Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, finding that the previous thefts were not part of
a single system (plan) and stating that intent was not a material issue in the
case.
29
21. State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973) (holding no proof of intent was required in
prosecution for aggravated rape, thus any evidence tending to prove intent was not admissible).
22. State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971). For a discussion of these concepts
of plan as embraced by other courts across the country, see Mary C. Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad
Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 604, 608 n.27 (1989). But
see Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 547 (recognizing a possible third meaning of plan, that is an
"unlinked" or "spurious" plan).
23. McCormick, supra note 10, at 801. See, e.g., State v. Mayer, 589 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1991); writ denied, 609 So. 2d 251 (1992).
24. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 128-29 (La. 1973). Although the predecessor to Article
404(B) did not speak of "plan," it was deemed subsumed under the concepts of system or modus
operandi. Modus operandi is defined as a method of operating or doing things. Black's Law
Dictionary 1004 (6th ed. 1990).
25. State v. Humphrey, 381 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1980). For a general discussion, see John
S. Herbrand, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Criminal Offenses by Proximity as
to Time and Place, 92 A.L.R. 3d 545 (1992).
26. George W. Pugh & James R. McCelland, Developments in the Law, Evidence, 43 La. L.
Rev. 413 (1982). An early example is State v. Bates, 46 La. Ann. 849, 15 So. 204 (1894), in which
the court held evidence of the defendant's prior theft of billiard balls was inadmissible to prove
system and intent because neither was a real issue in the case. The court said that for the evidence
to be admissible at all, "it must bear directly and materially upon, and have some connection with,
the issue before the jury." Id. at 850, 15 So. at 205.
27. 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374 (1928).
28. Id.
29. The court stated that intent was not an issue "as [it] seldom is in the case of larceny." Id.
1194 [Vol. 55
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Even before 1950, however, this protective attitude towards the rights of the
accused was not universal. For example, in the 1928 sexual offense case of State.
v. Cupit,3° the Louisiana Supreme Court held that evidence of a previous rape
of a niece eight years prior to the charged act was admissible to show guilty
knowledge and intent in the defendant's trial for assault with intent to commit
rape of a different fourteen-year-old niece.3
Between 1950 and 1973,32 the court continued a more relaxed attitude of
admissibility of other crimes evidence in sex cases.33 Further, the court
reflected a more receptive attitude towards admissibility of other crimes evidence
in other cases as well.34 For example, in State v. Skinner,35 in the defendant's
trial for possession and sale of marijuana, the prosecution was allowed to
introduce evidence of the sale of marijuana to a different undercover narcotics
agent seven days after the charged incident to prove knowledge, system, and
intent.
36
In 1973, however, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court had "serious
misgivings" of past approval of admission of other crimes evidence. 3 In State
v. Prieur, the court said it "believe[s] this Court has gone as far as possible, if
not too far, in approving admission of evidence of stale, unrelated offenses
without prior notice and other appropriate safeguards. '3 Most significantly, the
court stated the "spirit of our constitutional provisions ... requires the
establishment of safeguards [as a] prerequisite to the admissibility of such
evidence. 39  The court set strict standards the prosecution must follow to
introduce other crimes evidence, standards which require notice, hearing, and
evidence that is not a "subterfuge for depicting the defendant's bad character."'
at 894, 116 So. at 375. See also Jones, supra note 15, at 621.
30. 189 La. 509, 179 So. 837 (1938).
31. The idea, in Cupit, of admitting other crimes evidence in the sexual context was carried
further in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So. 2d 490 (1971).
32. Some commentators have made such distinctions. See Jones, supra note 15, at 617.
33. See Bolden, 257 La. at 60, 241 So. 2d at 490 (holding despite the fact that intent was not
at issue according to traditional notions, evidence that the defendant attempted to commit aggravated
rape on a different victim was admissible to show intent).
34. See generally Jones, supra note 15, at 623.
35. 251 La. 300, 204 So. 2d 370 (1967).
36. Id. at 337, 204 So. 2d at 383.
37. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
38. Id. at 130.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id. at 130. The court set the following standards:
When the state intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under the exceptions
outline in R.S. 15:445 and 446: (1) The State shall within a reasonable time before trial
furnish in writing to the defendant a statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer,
describing same with the general particularity required of an indictment or information.
No such notice is required as to evidence of offenses which are part of the res gestae, or
convictions used to impeach defendant's testimony. (2) In the written statement the State
shall specify the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the
admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses. (3) Prerequisite to the admissibility
1995] 1195
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In Prieur, the court held evidence of the defendant's purported prior armed
robbery of a gas station was not admissible to prove knowledge, intent, or system
in the present charge of armed robbery of a bus driver."' In another significant
case decided the same year, State v. Moore,4" the court further clarified the
rules of admissibility of other crimes evidence by stating that for other crimes
evidence to be admissible, the matter at issue must be real and genuine and not
one the prosecution conceives to be at issue merely because of a plea of not
guilty.
43
A. Prieur and its Progeny's Interpretations of the Intent Exception
In the context of specific intent cases, if the facts unambiguously pointed to
the required intent, there was strong indication that intent was not a "real issue"
in the case unless the question of intent was placed at issue by the defendant."
Arguably, the contrary principle also developed; therefore, the prosecution could
introduce other crimes evidence in its case-in-chief.45 In Prieur, since the court
deemed the facts to be unambiguous on the issue of intent, other crimes evidence
to show intent was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The
Louisiana Supreme Court stated had the defendant injected intent as an issue by
of the evidence is a showing by the State that the evidence of other crimes is not merely
repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for depicting the defendant's bad character
or his propensity for bad behavior, and that it serves the actual purpose for which it is
offered. (4) When the evidence is admitted before the jury, the court, if requested by
defense counsel, shall charge the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is
received and is to be considered. (5) Moreover, the final charge to the jury shall contain
a charge of the limited purpose for which the evidence was received, and the court shall
at this time advise the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted for any charge other
than the one named in the indictment or one responsive thereto.
Id. at 130.
41. Id. at 129. Armed robbery, at that time, was a specific intent crime.
42. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
43. Id. at 787.
44. Jones, supra note 15, at 618. See also State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 129 n.2 (La. 1973).
In situations in which intent is not placed at issue, the court has generally excluded such evidence.
In State v. Ambercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2151
(1980), evidence of prior threats against church personnel and of vandalism of the church was held
inadmissible to prove intent in the prosecution of defendant for first-degree murder of a priest. The
court said intent was not a real issue because the defendant contended he had not done the act at
all-not that he lacked the requisite intent. Id. at 1175. See also State v. Welch, 615 So. 2d 300
(La. 1993); State v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 259 (La. 1979). But see State v. Medlock, 297 So. 2d 190
(La. 1974). For examples of intent being placed at issue by the defendant's introduction of evidence
of accident, see State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983); State v. McKeever, 407 So. 2d 662 (La.
1981); State v. Driggers, 554 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989). For an example of the defendant
asserting the defense of innocent intent, thus placing intent at issue, see State v. LeCompte, 371 So.
2d 239 (La. 1978).
45. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 362 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1978). Even in this context, the probative
value must be weighed against the prejudicial effect. La. Code Evid. art. 403.
NOTES
introducing evidence of accident or inadvertence, the lower court might have
properly admitted the evidence."
B. Prieur and Its Progeny's Interpretations of the Plan/System Exception
In Prieur, evidence of the robbery of a gas station was not admissible as
evidence of a plan/system in the prosecution of the defendant for robbing a bus
driver.4 7 However, the court noted the evidence would have been admissible
to prove system if the prosecution had introduced evidence indicating the
defendant had robbed a different bus driver on the same comer, at the same time
of day, and just a few weeks before the crime in question."
Post-Prieur decisions have held that for evidence of other crimes to be
admissible to prove system, the other crimes must manifest peculiar and
distinctive similarities to the charged crime. In State v. Ledet,4" the court held
evidence which tended to show the defendant kidnapped and sexually assaulted
another victim five months after the charged act of aggravated rape was not
admissible under the system rubric.50 The acts, the court reasoned, were not
distinctively similar to demonstrate the perpetrator was the same person. 5'
Likewise, in State v. Frentz,5" the court held evidence that the defendant had
similar sexual acts with two other boys under the same circumstances was
inadmissible in defendant's current charge of aggravated crime against nature
with a person under the age of seventeen. 3
Frentz? and Ledet55 further articulated the principle that system evidence
could not be admitted when used to prove the doing of the charged act-it could
only be admitted to prove the identity of the perpetrator.56 Presumably, in the
former case, the evidence is excluded because its principal value is to show
propensity of a person to do this kind of act. Hence, admissibility is barred by
46. Prieur, 277 So. 2d at 129 n.2.
47. Id. at 128.
48. Id. at 129.
49. 345 So. 2d 474 (La. 1977).
50. Id. at 478-79.. The court stated the acts in question were more "noteworthy for their
differences than for their similarities." Id. at 478.
51. Id. at 479. See also State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339, 1343 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
941, 97 S. Ct. 2653 (1977) (holding the acts were strikingly similar and established the relevancy of
the extraneous offense to the robbery system employed by the defendants).
52. 354 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1978).
53. The defendant was the teacher of all of the victims and hired each boy to help him clean
his home. Each boy testified that when he went to the teacher's home to clean, the teacher
committed a similar sexual act upon him. The defendant admitted the boys went to his home but
denied any sexual activity took place. Id. at 1009.
54. 354 So. 2d at 1009.
55. 345 So. 2d 474, 479 (La. 1977).
56. Frentz, 354 So. 2d at 1009; Ledet, 345 So. 2d at 479. For a discussion of similar ideas
articulated in other state courts, see Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 544-46; Reed, supra note 10,
at 204.
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the rule against admissibility of character evidence. In the latter case, the
evidence has a value independent of propensity; it is relevant to show identi-
ty-that the defendant is one of the few people capable of doing the charged act.
Reconciling the above principle with State v. Hatcher, however, is
difficult." In Hatcher, the issue was not who was the perpetrator of the act but
whether the act was performed. 8 The court, with some difficulty, 9 upheld
the lower court's decision to admit the other crimes evidence introduced to prove
system in the defendant's prosecution for aggravated crime against nature.' In
this case, the defendant admitted coitus but consistently denied fellatio with the
victims.6' The court stated, "[in an unusual case, such as the present one, in
which the defendant causes the very doing of the act to become a genuine issue,
his design, scheme, etc., may be relevant to that issue."'62 The significance of
this distinction is difficult to understand. Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its
holdings in Ledet and Frentz.63
Two Louisiana court of appeal cases are inconsistent with the holdings of
Frentz and Ledet." In State v. Driggers," the second circuit approved the
admission of other crimes evidence in the defendant's prosecution for indecent
behavior with a juvenile and for aggravated oral sexual battery to show a pattern
or system that the defendant "generally took advantage of one-on-one situations
with female juveniles [and] that he was motivated by unnatural interest in pre-
pubescent and adolescent females."" In the third circuit decision of State v.
Howard,67 the defendant was charged with the aggravated rape of his eleven-
year-old daughter. The court approved admission of purported prior sexual
offenses by the defendant with the victim's step-sister to prove a plan to
57. 372 So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979). In Hatcher, the court set out the following requirements for
admissiblity of other crimes evidence to prove system: 1) the evidence of other crimes and the
evidence of defendant's connection to them must be clear and convincing; 2) the modus operandi
employed by the defendant in both the other bad act and the crime charged must be so peculiarly
distinctive that one must logically conclude they were done by the same person; 3) the other bad act
must be relevant for some purpose other than to show defendant is a bad person who probably
committed the crime; 4) the other bad act must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue in the
case; and 5) the probative worth of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. Id. at 1033.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1037.
60. The defendant was also charged with forcible rape. However, the other crimes evidence
in question was not relevant to that charge. Id. at 1029.
61. The defendant appeared to each young girl as a talent scout, showed them a newspaper
clipping, and had forced sexual acts with each victim. Id. at 1027-28.
62. Id. at 1035.
63. Id. at 1035-36. The court also upheld the holding of State v. Jackson, 352 So. 2d 195 (La.
1977).
64. See Pugh et al., supra note 15, at 298 (stating that these cases have "hearken[ed] back to
the Pre-Prieur approach").
65. 554 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 724.
67. 520 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 790 (La. 1988).
1198 [Vol. 55
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systematically engage in sexual relations with his daughters.6
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Bailey, 9 however, indicated
disapproval of Driggers. In Bailey, the supreme court rejected the lower court's
reliance on Driggers and held that in the prosecution of the defendant for
molestation of his youngest child, evidence of the defendant's purported
molestation of his two oldest daughters was inadmissible.7" The court said the
testimony did not "establish the defendant's particular motive for committing the
charged crime against the prosecutrix ... and it otherwise fails to establish a
pattern of committing sexual offenses against the same prosecutrix."7'
The Driggers and Howard decisions also are inconsistent with the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision in State v. Jamison.72 In the defendant's prosecution
for aggravated rape of his daughter and step-daughter, the supreme court in
Jamison held the trial court should not have admitted evidence of molestations
of other family members. The court stated the evidence of bad acts with
someone other than the victim should have been excluded because it did not
establish the defendant's particular system for committing the charged crime
against the prosecutrix, and the probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.73
C. Prieur and its Progeny's Interpretations of Remoteness
Prior to Jackson, with respect to the significance of remoteness of other
crimes evidence, Louisiana courts have stated that balancing the probative worth
of evidence against its prejudicial effect is a fact-sensitive analysis in which
remoteness between the other crime and the charged act, among other things,
should be taken into consideration.74 The Louisiana Supreme Court has not
articulated any time frame as to when the evidence is too remote to be
admitted.75 In one case, State v. Driggers, the court of appeal concluded
evidence of other crimes committed twenty-six years before the charged act was
not too remote to deplete the probative worth of the evidence.76
68. Id. at 1154.
69. 588 So. 2d 90 (La. 1991) (per curiam).
70. Id. See also Pugh, supra note 15, at 298 n.4.
71. 588 So. 2d at 90 (citing State v. Sutfield, 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978); State v. Acliese, 403
So. 2d 665 (La. 1981)).
72. 617 So. 2d 480 (La. 1993).
73. Id. at 481.
74. State v. Humphrey, 381 So. 2d 813 (La. 1980).
75. See, e.g., Humphrey, 381 So. 2d at 813.
76. 554 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cit. 1989). See also State v. Howard, 520 So. 2d 1150 (La.
App. 3d Ci. 1987), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 790 (La. 1988). Similarly, other states' courts have
admitted evidence of sexual acts with different victims despite the long passage of time between the
other crime and the charged act. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 325 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. 1985); State v.
Stephens, 466 N.W.2d 781 (Neb. 1991). But see State v. Strobel, 554 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1988). See
generally Reed, supra note 10, at 154-56.
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III. THE JACKSON CASE AND ITS EFFECT ON PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Jackson court relied in part on a 1938 Louisiana Supreme Court
case and two post-Prieur court of appeal decisions," only speculation about the
ramifications of Jackson on the prior jurisprudence can be offered. The court in
Jackson did not analyze the significance of the post-Prieur supreme court cases
discussed above. The court did not expressly overrule any of its post-Prieur
decisions; and by excluding evidence of the defendant's purported other acts of
actual intercourse with his daughters,7 8 the court indicated continued adherence
to at least parts of its post-Prieur approach.79 A question remains as to whether
Jackson's holding is limited to sex cases with children (or even narrower, to
misconduct between family members) or whether its precepts apply generally to
all crimes. If the latter is accurate, the court is rejecting strict application of the
rule prohibiting character evidence as implemented in cases such as State v.
Sutfield, ° which was cited by the court with approval earlier the same year."
In Sutfield, an armed robbery case, the court excluded evidence in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief that tended to show the defendants were addicted to
narcotics. The court found this evidence "had little, if any, relevance for a
purpose other than to show a probability that the defendants committed the crime
on trial because they were men of criminal character."'82 The court also stated
any probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.83
By citing Driggers, Cupit, and Howard, the supreme court implied that its
reasoning in Jackson applies to special circumstances present in sexual
misconduct cases with children. If so, with the Jackson case, Louisiana joins a
national trend toward the admissibility of other crimes evidence in child
molestation cases."
77. 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993).
78. Id. at 152.
79. Id. The court classified this evidence as "irrelevant." Id. at 151-52. In this writer's
opinion, this classification is questionable. That the defendant purportedly committed more extreme
sexual acts in the past, i.e., having intercourse with one daughter, seems to be relevant to the question
of whether he fondled his grandchildren. See generally IA Wigmore, supra note 10, at 1212.
80. 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978).
81. State v. Jamison, 617 So. 2d 480, 481 (La. 1993).
82. 354 So. 2d at 1338.
83. Id. at 1338.
84. A national trend has developed in courts and legislatures to reform evidence rules in child
molestation cases. See Josephine Bulkley et al., A Judicial Primer on Child Sexual Abuse 63 (1994);
see also Evidence Rule 414 which states in part:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child
molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which
it is relevant ....
Fed. R. Evid. 414. For a discussion of this rule, see Bryden, supra note 11, at 566; Reed, supra note
10, at 145.
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Although the facts in Jackson are similar to those of Jamison and Bailey,
two of the court's more recent pronouncements on the subject, neither the
prosecution's nor the defendant's briefs to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
Jackson cite the aforementioned cases.85 The court's decision in Jackson,
admitting evidence of the defendant's sexual acts with his daughters that
occurred fifteen to twenty years before the charge of molestation of his
granddaughters, is inconsistent with the holding of Jamison." One may be able
to distinguish Jamison and Bailey because the accused's intent was not an issue
in those cases.87 Like Jackson, however, those cases concerned whether the
charged physical act had in fact been committed. To show the act had been
committed, trial courts had admitted other crimes evidence to show a pattern of
conduct, as contemplated in Jackson.88 Further, Jamison's holding establishes
a more general concept-limiting admissibility of other sex crimes to acts with
the alleged victims of the charged acts-which should apply to situations similar
to Jackson.89
In addition to the inconsistency with Jamison and Bailey, the Jackson case
has great significance in other areas of other crimes evidence law. In Jackson,
intent was determined to be a real issue in the prosecution's case-in-chief
although there was no indication that the defendant would place intent at
issue.9° It is difficult to determine from evidence at a pre-trial hearing whether
the purported facts were ambiguous as to the question of intent. Without
referring to the above suggested distinctions, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Jackson stated that evidence to prove intent was deemed admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief to "negate any defense that he [defendant] acted
without intent or that the acts were accidental."' Does this mean that the court
is unwilling to accept the suggested distinction as a general matter or that it is
unwilling to accept it where the substance of the crime requires a specific intent
to "arous[e] or gratif[y] ... sexual desires?"'  The answer is not clear.
The ruling that other crimes evidence was admissible to prove plan is
inconsistent with much of the post-Prieur jurisprudence. Certainly, the other
85. Memorandum in Support of Application for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Jackson, 625 So.
2d 146 (La. 1993) (No. 93-KK-0424); Response to Application for Writ of Certiorari, State v.
Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993) (No. 93-KK-0424).
86. The case was taken by the supreme court on a supervisory writ after a Prieur hearing was
held at the district court. There was no evidence in the case, nor in the briefs to the supreme court,
that the defendant had asserted an innocent intent. Id.
87. See State v. Jamison, 617 So. 2d 480 (La. 1993); State v. Bailey, 588 So. 2d 90 (La. 1991).
88. 617 So. 2d at 480; 588 So. 2d at 90.
89. 617 So. 2d at 480; 588 So. 2d at 90.
90. Relying on State v. Cupit, 189 La. 809, 179 So. 837 (1938), the court reasoned that since
specific intent was an "essential ingredient" of the crime charged, the jurisprudence has recognized
the principle that "evidence of similar but disconnected" other crimes is admissible to prove intent.
625 So. 2d at 150.
91. Id. at 150.
92. La. R.S. 14:81.2 (1994).
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crimes evidence in this case does not fit under the first notion of plan.93 The
Jackson court followed the second notion of plan/system' and reasoned the
"distinctive similarities between the generational molestations call for their
admission."95  In Frentz and Ledet, however, evidence proffered to prove
system was excluded even when the acts occurred within a few months of each
other since the similarities were not particularly distinctive." The Jackson
court applied a more relaxed application of these concepts.97 Although one can
share the court's great concern with the problem of sexual abuse of children, in
this wiriter's opinion, the narrower approach reflected in Frentz and Ledet is the
preferable approach.9"
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though evidence of other crimes in child molestation cases arguably
has probative worth as has been suggested," it is arguably very prejudicial as
well. Because of the horrible nature of the crime and the increased societal
debate about child sexual abuse, a jury that hears allegations of prior acts of
abuse is more likely to convict the defendant for the instant charge."° While
the courts have and should recognize the unique circumstances when the victim
of a crime is a child,'' the court should carefully balance any special concerns
with the protections afforded to the accused by the criminal justice system. In
Jackson, the evidence was highly prejudicial and should have only been
admitted, if at all, on rebuttal.
Recent congressional legislation has gone beyond the Jackson decision
toward abolishing the character evidence rule in child molestation cases.'0 2 It
93. McCormick, supra note 10. Under this concept, the father would have had to contemplate
all the various acts of misconduct at one time-which is inconceivable since the acts occurred fifteen
to twenty years apart. Golden, supra note 18, at 199-200; see generally Reed, supra note 10, at 202.
94. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
95. 625 So. 2d at 150.
96. State v. Frentz, 354 So. 2d 1007, 1009 (La. 1978); State v. Ledet, 345 So. 2d 474, 478-79
(La. 1977).
97. Even if the other crimes evidence does not fit under the notions of plan, the court could
conceivably be adopting a new exception specifically for child molestation cases. Courts across the
country have been willing to admit evidence by broadly interpreting plan as in Jackson. See
generally Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 548; see, e.g., State v. Oliphant, 250 N.W.2d 443 (Mich.
1976); State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043 (R.I. 1994); State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wisc.
1987). But see People v. Tassel, 679 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1984).
98. 354 So. 2d at 1007; 345 So. 2d at 474. See generally Bulkley, supra note 84, at 86 (citing
Edward lmwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 36 (1984 & Supp. 1992)).
99. Bulkley, supra note 84, at 85.
100. Hutton, supra note 22, at 605.
101. Hutton, supra note 22, at 604 (listing special exceptions including: broadening the rules
to admit a child's hearsay statements, video taping of a child's statement, and removing child
witnesses.).
102. See supra note 84.
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is inconsistent to allow character evidence in child molestation cases, but to
retain the rule of general exclusion of such evidence for other crimes such as
murder. °3 Recidivism'0" rates are not higher for child molesters than for
violent offenders. In fact, incest offenders generally have lower rates of
recidivism than other offenders.0 5 While the age of the victim may magnify
the need for other crimes evidence, it also magnifies the danger that the
admission of such evidence will divert the jury's attention and will prejudice the
defendant. Because of the current instability of distinguishable data"° and
because of the strong, established precedent against allowing character evidence
to enter into a trial, the character evidence rule should remain intact for child
molestation cases. As one commentator stated, "[t]here is nothing unique about
sex offenses which justifies a special rule. It is, however, the public reaction to
evidence in sex crimes which makes them unique.""7
Amy E. Collier
103. Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 558-59.
104. Recidivision is "a tendency to relapse into previous condition or mode of behavior."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 957 (1979).
105. Bulkley, supra note 84, at 8. See also Reed, supra note 10, at 154; Hutton, supra note 22,
at 616; Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 572.
106. Bulldey, supra note 84, at 7-9. See also Reed, supra note 10, at 223, 242.
107. Reed, supra note 10, at 217.
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